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Abstract
This chapter investigates various usages of semiotic objects in science education, such as 
arrows and graphics. We propose a series of examples drawn from physics schoolbooks, 
school tasks, and research data to investigate the semiotic roles of these objects in their 
specific context of use, which is to teach physics. It is not necessary to know physics prior 
to the reading of this chapter: we are analyzing signs and possible interpretations. The 
aim is to illustrate potential situations of misunderstanding related to semiotic objects, 
taking into account a novice standpoint. For instance, the comparison of various uses of 
arrows on a single sketch reveals the diversity of semiotic roles played by the same object. 
It illustrates the need for coordination between semiotic registers by the interpretant for a 
successful mediated communication. The results also stress the particular challenges of 
such coordination in science modeling. It advocates for more practice of modeling and 
for students to take a more active part in the process, in order to prepare them to interpret 
models more easily, and for teachers and students to share more explicit discourses and 
usages of semiotic objects.
Keywords: physics, science education, modeling, schoolbook, mediation, 
misunderstanding
“Language is the source of misunderstandings.”
The Little Prince, Antoine de St-Exupéry, 1943, chapter XXI.
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and eproduction in any medium, provi ed the origi al work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
Science education is known for being challenging, and has led to an abundant research litera‐
ture interested notably in students’ conceptions [1–2] and conceptual change [3–5], teaching 
methods, and approaches [6–12]. The mediation of teaching and learning through language 
and semiotic tools of various sorts has been largely overlooked [13]. Yet, the few research 
including language and semiotics in the analysis of teaching and learning bring interesting 
results, see for instance [14, 15]. In cognitive psychology, most research assume in their method 
of data collection and analysis, that the interpretation of questions and tasks by students and 
research participants are nonproblematic [16], and that students’ use of language is similar to 
the teachers’ use when referring to concepts, which leads researchers to assimilate students’ 
answers to their own conceptions of knowledge [17]. When assessing students’ understand‐
ing in problem‐solving tasks, for instance, the measured performance is typically indistinctly 
challenging students’ conception in physics and ability to make sense of the question.
This chapter proposes an investigation of a few semiotic objects mediating the communication 
in physics classroom, and show that signs are both facilitating understanding and providing 
specific pitfalls for misunderstanding. The work presented is a semiotic analysis of teach‐
ing material in physics, mainly schoolbooks for college or high school. It may be of inter‐
est for educational psychology, science education research, cognitive psychology—in which 
language and semiotic analysis are often missing—and for suggestion of further research in 
semiotics.
The research methodology is inductive: starting from peculiar practices experts have grown 
used to, from writing conventions or commonalities, we propose a set of examples illustrat‐
ing the fact that signs commonly used in physics can be challenging for interpretation due 
to various reasons. We proceed to the analysis of possible interpretation, in a fashion that 
can be assimilated to Artigue [18] and Brousseau [19] a priori analysis. One example is the 
challenging task of coordination between various semiotic registers and objects, which we 
exemplify in the next section. Another reason is the lack of clues or conventions in the use of 
semiotic objects which can play different semiotic roles. We will address this issue in the third 
section, taking the example of the arrow. In the last section, we will discuss the communica‐
tive counterpart of the use of semiotic tools for mediating knowledge, as a risk for situation of 
misunderstanding to emerge.
2. Coordination of semiotic objects and registers
This first section investigates a few situations where students in physics must deal with 
semiotic objects of various kinds. Duval develops the idea that learning concepts sometimes 
requires a coordination of semiotic registers [20]. He proposes to approach the problem raised 
by the change of semiotic register, typically when dealing with a problem‐solving exercise using 
both a natural language and a formal language such as mathematics, not only as a form of 
expression but as a task of coordination, in the piagetian sense. Duval argues that for  reasoning 
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with several semiotic registers, these must be coordinated. We propose here to extend the anal‐
ysis of the problem of coordination stressed by Duval about semiotic register to semiotic objects, 
and to semiotic standpoints in order to analyze specific cognitive tasks of interpretation of 
signs of various kinds within their specific semiotic context. We draw on this contribution of 
Duval’s work, which fits with the piagetian theory, yet his distinction between various types 
of representation based on information processing theory seems problematic for the purpose 
of our analysis, for the reason raised in the introduction. Moreover, signs are not only used 
for expressing one’s thought—as Duval defines it—but also as a mediator or semiotic tool for 
thinking [21]. Here is a first example.
2.1. A first example
A physics student in her oral examination tries to remember why a stone dropped from the 
top of the Eiffel tower is theoretically not falling quite vertically [22]. To help her, the teacher 
lets her draw a sketch and ask her to trace the stone’s trajectory on it. She draws a vertical line 
(reproduced in Figure 1).
The obstacle on which the student stumbles over here is about the meaning of vertical across 
the two semiotic registers at stake, i.e., the natural or scientific language in which the ques‐
tion is addressed, and the sketch. The coordination of the drawing of a line and the concept 
vertical is achieved, from the teacher’s standpoint, through the relativity of the vertical to the 
center of gravity of the Earth. Hence, an expected vertical fall would be drawn on the sketch 
as a line starting from the top of the tower to the center of the circle representing the Earth. 
From this coordination, the teacher aims at displaying the influence of the rotation of the 
earth on this specific verticality. The teacher uses vertical as a concept, in the sense that con‐
cepts are related to a broader set of meaning, and more particularly here to a formal system 
[23]. It is literally impossible for the teacher to declare a line vertical without a reference point 
such as the center of gravity of the Earth which, together with the falling object, defines the 
system.
Figure 1. Reproduction of the student’s sketch.
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From the student’s standpoint, however, vertical is a standalone notion, which stands for 
something like “from high to low in a straight line, or vice versa.” The coordination between 
the drawing of a line and the use of the word is relative to this notion of vertical which, in 
terms, poses problem because the conventions of drawing is to consider the top of the paper 
higher. Conclusively, the students must draw a line from the top to the bottom of the paper 
(or vice‐versa) to make it vertical. In other words, the coordination of the vertical line (graphi‐
cal register) and the vertical fall (natural language register) fails in making a single meaning, 
what Duval calls a semantic univocity. The student failed to coordinate drawing conventions 
and modeling in physics.
To raise the issue analyzed here, a teacher can simply ask the following surprising question:
“Why is the attraction of the Earth vertical and towards the lower?”
The answer is disquieting, precisely because it is unusual at school: the attraction of the Earth 
is vertical and towards the lower per definition of vertical and lower.
The ambiguity is nevertheless not only linguistic: it is precisely the coordination of draw‐
ing conventions from which, most often, vertical is understood by children as a notion of 
natural language, and the vertical as a concept of physics, which can be represented geo‐
metrically or mathematically with a direction and a sense, but only relatively to a gravita‐
tional field.
In a piagetian theoretical framework, the coordination is a higher-order process relating oper‐
ations on objects. Transposed in semiotics, the objects are symbolic—they are signs—and the 
operations are operations in the interpretation of the signs, i.e., operations (co)constructing 
the meaning for a particular subject. In order to avoid the theoretical reductionism inherent to 
formal logic, we rely on Grize’s logico‐discursive operations [24] rather than on Piaget’s logic of 
signification [25]. Grize’s Natural Logic provides an open‐system logic allowing the researcher 
to investigate operations specific to the tasks under scrutiny, to the interpreting psychologi-
cal subject in his/her particular situation, context, and history. Moreover, when the semiotic 
coordination involves several registers, it can be described as the coordination between opera‐
tions of different kinds. Based on this approach, the challenge posed to the student in this first 
example, while interpreting the physics task, can be analyzed as the coordination between 
logico‐discursive operations transforming the object‐class {vertical} and concrete operation 
transforming the sketch, i.e., |drawing a line|.
2.2. A second example
The following task can be used for inducing to use trigonometry in problem-solving. It is 
designed for first grade college (high-school) students in Neuchâtel, a small town of Switzerland 
south of which we can see the Alps, but not the sea. The sea is further south, at the other side 
of the Alps. Here is the problem:
• Evaluate the relevance of the saying: “Raze the Alps to the ground, to let us see the sea!”
Students will come to the conclusion that razing the Alps to the ground is probably insuffi‐
cient to see the sea, because of the bend of the Earth. An observer should stand higher to have 
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a chance to spot the sea side in Genoa. Students can evaluate the constraint for a Neuchâtelois 
to see the sea, and they probably will produce a sketch alike the one reproduced in Figure 2.
This task is an alternative version of the first example: students must succeed a coordination 
of two semiotic registers, a linguistic one for the question in natural language and an analogi‐
cal one for the drawn sketch.
Here, the coordination of various semiotic registers involves the coordination of semiotic stand‐
points, i.e., standpoints taken semiotically, a standpoint in reference of a position that is not 
concretely adopted by the interpreter. In Piaget’s famous mountain experiment, children are 
alternatively moving physically to adopt a different concrete standpoint, or asked to adopt a 
standpoint in imagination, semiotically, i.e., through the use of signs such as the drawing of the 
mountains and a dot representing the standpoint from which to look at the mountains. In this 
second example, the student must coordinate two semiotic standpoints for his problem‐solving:
1. The standpoint of the Neuchâtelois who desires seeing the sea;
2. A standpoint from space, looking at the Earth from far enough to see it round, and to im‐
agine the line from the observer to the sea in Genoa, in order to check wherever this line is 
interrupted by the Earth surface or not.
Hence, in this task, the coordination of standpoints is required not only to evaluate the conse‐
quences of the bend of the Earth on the horizon of a Neuchâtelois, but also for the actual draw‐
ing of a sketch as the one reproduced above (Figure 2), since the students have to make their 
own sketch and use it as a semiotic tool to solve the problem, not just as a way of expressing the 
solution. The coordination of standpoints is hence constitutive to the problem‐solving, and to 
(some aspect of) the concept of curvature of the Earth.
This analysis contributes to explain the difficulty of this apparently simple question. As 
pointed by Mounoud [26], coordination of standpoints remains a challenging cognitive task 
until late in the cognitive development, and also for adults.
Figure 2. A simplified sketch.
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2.3. A third example
The trajectory of the free fall of a thrown object corresponds to (a part of) a parabola (see 
Figure 3, the graphic on the left). Yet, the time graph of vertical free fall also corresponds to a 
parabola (see Figure 3, the graphic on the right).
The challenge for interpretation appears immediately: the drawing of a graph triggers gener‐
ally a spatial or spatiotemporal representation by the reader, thus both graphs are interpreted 
as representing a trajectory. Two comments must be done here, to specify the use of a semiotic 
tool such as a graph by physicists:
1. The free fall is for a physicist the movement of a material dot in the absence of any other 
forces than gravity or, in any other case where all other forces would be exactly balanced. 
Hence, it is not a parachute jump before parachute opening…
2. A graph is not a drawing—however one can draw a graph. This last expression is introduced 
here provocally, in order to stress the difference between the graph as a mathematical ob‐
ject and the drawing of the graph, its graphical representation which we will call graphic 
here.
In this third example, students need to coordinate the analogical semiotic register of the graph‐
ics with the observation of a falling object. Moreover, it is with the coordination of the two 
graphics—two objects of the same semiotic register—that students may achieve a more com‐
plete understanding of the mathematical object graph. Hence, the cognitive task requires the 
coordination between two specific semiotic objects of the same semiotic register: the progres‐
sive construction of the two graphics can be displayed with a simulator, in order to support 
students understanding the parabola as a mathematical object, a semiotic tool, independently 
to what it represents in a particular use.
The congruence between the two graphics and the observed trajectories of the object “falling” 
freely is achieved through a common timetable, here, through synchronization. This  synchronization 
Figure 3. Drawing of the graphs of, on the left, the trajectory of the free fall of a thrown object (x‐ and y‐axis in meters) 
and, on the right, the position‐time graph of a vertical free fall (x‐axis in seconds, y‐axis in meters).
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is a specific type of coordinations of semiotic objects which can be supported by the simultaneous 
construction of the two graphics on a simulator. Both graphics are nevertheless referring to a 
common semiotic tool in mathematics: the graph.
2.4. A fourth example
Figure 4 presents an electrical diagram, conventional representation of the assembly of various 
resistors and an electricity source of 12 V.
The resistors are assembled in series, yet the diagram displays them in parallel. The expected 
coordination between the diagram and the electrical assembly it represents is a differentia‐
tion: students have to differentiate a parallel setting on the diagram and the parallel assembly.
Remark: an usual French translation of the word resistor is résistance. Thus the French signi‐
fier résistance is used as a metonymy, since it denotes [24] an object which has a resistance as a 
physical property, which can be measured in order to define the resistance with a number—
the name of which is taken from the process of opposing resistance to the electrical flow. What 
a lot of pitfalls for the students’ interpretation!
3. This is not an arrow
Diagrams and sketches are complex semiotic objects and play an important role both in the 
making of scientific models and in supporting students to understand these models and 
the related concepts. In order to investigate this complexity, we propose here to approach it 
through the description of the diverse usages and functions played by a specific object com‐
monly met in diagrams and sketches: the arrow.
Figure 4. An electrical diagram.
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Arrows are commonly used in physics classroom. Schoolbooks and exercise sheets fre‐
quently offer sketches to illustrate the verbal instructions or explanations. In these repre‐
sentations, the arrow is a semiotic object aiming at a better communication and transmission 
of knowledge, and eliciting the cognitive task expected from the students. Yet, arrows 
are in turn used by students to support their reasoning, or formulate their answers, i.e., 
as semiotic tools for learning or doing physics. The way students will use the arrows as 
semiotic tools may be influenced by the way it is used to elicit the taught knowledge. In 
order to investigate this question, we will present examples from schoolbooks and exercise 
sheets. These examples tend to show that arrows, as semiotic objects, are neither used in a 
way supporting a regular and rigorous congruence for the coordination between semiotic 
registers, neither according to well‐established conventions as for the electrical diagram, 
for instance.
Our analysis of arrows as semiotic objects is descriptive—it stresses the properties of the signs 
themselves, such as the sense and direction, the line and/or color of the arrow—and func‐
tional. For the functional analysis, we investigate the semiotic role [27] played by a specific 
arrow in its particular context.
The examples presented below are analyzed following two steps.
First, we provide examples where arrows sharing the same properties play various roles. The 
semiotic role is differentiated from the semiotic function of Piaget, which refers to the general 
capacity of using signs, symbols, and icons. The semiotic role of a sign, symbol or icon is 
always specific to the objective of communication or interpretation and is situated historically, 
socially, relatively to a domain of knowledge (such as physics), etc. It is relatively to the spe‐
cific objectives of communication in a school context of teaching physics that we will analyze 
the challenge of interpretation for the learners, when a sign such as an arrow plays several 
semiotic roles within the same sketch or schoolbook. Novices in physics are confronted to the 
double task consisting in (1) the assimilation of the semiotic objects themselves in relation to 
a domain-specific knowledge, and (2) the appropriation of the object as tools to support their 
learning, reasoning, and to produce relevant answers.
Second, after distinguishing various semiotic roles for arrows, examples will be provided of a 
diversity of semiotic objects for a particular semiotic role. Just like the diversity of roles for arrows 
can lead interpretants into difficulties, we argue that the diversity of semiotic objects for play‐
ing the same role may be challenging for whom has to infer the meaning from the regularity 
and the congruence between semiotic register, i.e., the regular association of a specific semiotic 
object with a specific semiotic role.
3.1. A first analysis: a single object for various semiotic roles
The analysis shows that a single semiotic object—the arrow—can play various semiotic roles. 
Figure 5 presents a sketch of “simple levers” from a schoolbook for secondary school [28].
This sketch contains two arrows with identical outlines. The first arrow, circled by us in red, 
denotes the application of a force and represents the sense, direction and maybe the intensity 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Semiotics192
(yet without any scale) of the vector used for modeling the force. A second arrow, circled by 
us in blue, points to a location on the sketch and associates a caption “rotational axis” to it. 
These arrows play two different semiotic roles.
First, the arrow encircled in red indicates some of the properties (and more) of the mathemati‐
cal object used for modeling the force, the vector: the arrow materializes the application point, 
the sense, direction and (maybe) the magnitude of a vector. There is a conceptual congruence 
between the analogical semiotic register to which the arrow belongs, and the linguistic semi‐
otic register to which the vector belongs (mathematical language). Yet, the arrow can only be 
congruent with the vector for a specific instant of the application of the force. A brief instant 
later or earlier, the vector modeling the force could be of a different magnitude, direction or 
even sense, depending on the situation.
In addition, the arrow encircled in blue plays a role of pointing to a location, of guidance 
of the interpretant’s attention. In this sense, the meaning of this arrow is similar to a verbal 
deictic such as “this one,” yet in an analogical semiotic register. It can contribute to a joint 
attention in the social interaction mediated by the written schoolbook. The arrow encircled in 
blue is not the only semiotic object used in Figure 5 to guide the reader’s attention: a caption 
“object which resists” is related to the sketch of the object by a simple line playing the same 
role. Hence, two different  semiotic objects are used in this sketch for a single semiotic role.
Moreover, the “object which resists” applies a force—the “resistance”—on the crowbar, but 
there isn’t any arrow to represent this particular force. In addition to use arrows for various 
semiotic roles, and to use various semiotic objects for the same semiotic role, there is no system‐
atic use of arrows for a single semiotic role in the sketch: while the red arrow represents a vector 
modeling one force, no arrows can be found for representing the vectors modeling other forces.
3.2. A second analysis: arrows and movement
In the previous example (Figure 5), the sketch does not suggest any change or movement, 
but rather a static situation. Arrows are nevertheless often associated with movement in other 
contexts, such as the sketch below, taken from the same schoolbook (see Figure 6).
Figure 5. A sketch about simple levers, extract from [28], p. 323.
Using Signs for Learning and Teaching Physics: From Semiotic Tools to Situations of Misunderstanding
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67429
193
In this sketch, the arrow plays a different semiotic role: it allows to represent a movement on 
a semiotic support (paper) that cannot move or be transformed itself in a way that displays 
movement (contrary to a luminous screen, for instance, which can be used to trigger the illu‐
sion of movement). There might be a difference in the interpretation of Figure 6 between 
novice and expert: for the common reader, the arrow may directly represent a movement. 
With some imagination, the reader may even see the various wheels “turning” in the direction 
denotated by the arrows. For a trained physicist, the same semiotic objects—the arrows—may 
rather denotate a theoretical object, a concept, i.e., vectors, which are in turn used to model 
the velocity of the wheels. If interpreted as vectors, the various lengths of the drawn arrows 
in Figure 6 raise questions: are they corresponding to various intensities of the vectors of 
velocity, are they depending on the diameter of the wheels or just random and meaningless? 
The directions and senses of the drawn arrows are also problematic to interpret as directions 
and senses of each corresponding vector: the arrows have no direction and the sense would 
rather correspond to a “rotational vector” perpendicular to the disk than to a vector model‐
ing velocity. Hence, the congruence between the two semiotic registers is difficult to establish 
with this sketch.
Moreover, the arrows as semiotic objects, are more than vectors, since they have a position 
(on the sketch), while vectors are “nowhere.” This particular point may lead students to con‐
sider that the arrow is the vector—and it is indeed a common misunderstanding. This misun‐
derstanding has obvious consequences on the reasoning, questions, and answers. Moreover, 
it is meaningless to draw arrows curved if they represent vectors in Figure 6: the vector is 
never curved… this curvature has more to do with the trajectory. These various ambiguities 
about the arrows of Figure 6 provides an illustration of the difficulties a novice can encounter 
when interpreting a sketch in physics where the semiotic roles are undifferentiated: arrows in 
Figure 6 could represent movements, velocities, trajectories, vectors or a mix of these. On the 
other hand, learning physics entails differentiating movement and trajectory. This differentia‐
tion made Newton able to set a radically new approach, according to Koyré [29]: a mathemati‐
cal model connecting forces and movement, and not only prediction of trajectories, which was 
the concern of medieval physics—in particular for shooting cannonballs accurately.
This analysis shows that the differences of interpretation of arrows on a sketch between nov‐
ice and expert can lead to specific misunderstandings. When the arrows are interpreted by 
experts as vectors, logico‐discursive objects used to model a physical phenomenon at a chosen 
Figure 6. A sketch about rotational movement, extract from [28], p. 323.
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instant, they can be interpreted by novices as movement, trajectories or an undifferentiated 
mixture of the two, leading them to imagine a movement from the sketch while the attention 
of the expert is on a specific instant, making of the sketch a static representation.
Let us go back on the first example with this new hypothesis and examine how it could work 
on the sketch of Figure 5. Could students interpret this sketch as designating a rotational 
movement of the crowbar? The caption “rotational axis” may support such misunderstanding. 
Indeed, learners should not use the convention associating arrows and movement; otherwise, 
the confusion between force and velocity—often observed by physics students [30]—may be 
strengthened all the better. The confusion pointed here concerns also the sketch as a whole: if 
it represents a static situation—which is the case of Figure 5—vectors are modeling a motive 
force at a given instant, and hence there is no movement at all to be considered. Students can 
nevertheless be tempted to think of such movement, since the effect of the motive force in real-
ity is a movement: when one presses on the crowbar, it is for moving the nail out of the plank. 
However, modeling the movement of the crowbar and the nail requires different semiotic 
means, a different sketch, or more than a sketch.
In conclusion, the fact that the arrow only represents a vector at a given instant is crucial 
for understanding the physics of the phenomena. Using a written semiotic object such as 
an arrow to represent a model which has kinetic features—possibly better represented by 
a video document for instance—consists in a reductionism which is impacting differently 
on the interpretation depending on the objective of the communication. Yet, even when the 
teacher’s objective is to address with a sketch a static situation for which the reduction to an 
instant is of no consequences, students may interpret the same sketch thinking of a dynamic 
phenomenon, trying to establish a congruence between the sketch and a movement. It seems 
therefore important that the use of a sketch comes to the interpretant with explanation about 
the specific objectives it may be useful for, be it in the communication or modeling.
3.3. A third analysis: differentiating arrows
In this analysis, we present examples of sketches dealing with semiotic challenges with a 
diversity of arrows. We start with examples providing clues to support the coordination 
between semiotic registers by the interpretants, and pursue with an ambiguous sketch about 
forces, discussing the question of norms for semiotics in physics.
In the following extract (see Figure 7) of an old schoolbook [31], arrows are used for pointing 
to the representation of a scale, on which the reader is invited to read a value (called α).
In order to represent two situations of equilibrium on the same sketch, one without any 
weight and one with a hanging weight “A,” arrows are differentiated: one has a dotted line, 
the other a full line. This precaution may avert the misunderstanding of arrows as movement, 
which we discussed above. Indeed, the plurality of arrows may be interpreted as signifying 
that each arrow only represents a particular state of affair, and not a movement or process.
In this sketch, arrows do not denotate vectors which are used to model forces, but rather des‐
ignates the orientation of the look of the physicist measuring the force applied by the weights 
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“A” and “B” on a bending stem at the moment of equilibrium. In both cases, the target concept 
of the communication is the force, yet the approach is different: arrows denoting vectors play 
a role of modeling, while arrows pointing to a scale play a role of directing the attention or 
designating a measuring activity.
The semiotics of this sketch relies on a double representation—the representation of two situ‐
ation of equilibrium—in order to communicate the semiotic role of the arrows as representing 
static balance of forces. This representation is reinforced with the representation of a variable 
(called α) and by another similar sketch representing another weight (“B”), which suggests a 
difference in mass with a difference in shape and size on the sketch. In reference to physics, 
the semiotic role of the sketch, which is to refer to static situations, is better supported than 
we could show in the first analysis (see Figure 5). Yet, the reader needs, for making sense of 
the measuring on the scale, to understand the process of bending of the stem after hanging 
the weight at one end which refers to an the asymptotic situation of equilibrium—when the 
stem has stopped bouncing up and down—which theoretically happens after … an eternity!
If arrows all play the same semiotic role of pointing to in this sketch, other roles can be found 
for the arrow in the same book, and not further than the next page. It will be the example dis‐
cussed in our third analysis, and raises the question of the coherence of semiotic roles within 
a schoolbook or, more generally, within physics.
Figure 7. Illustration of the measuring of a force [31], p. 17.
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The following example provides an explicit caption for an arrow. In the first sketch of the chap‐
ter on forces in a schoolbook [31], one arrow is used to denotate the vector AF (see Figure 8).
The congruence between the semiotic registers is explicited in the caption of the figure, next 
to the sketch, which states: “Any body is subject to the attracting force of the Earth: its weight. 
The vector  
⟶
 AF represents such a force, of an intensity equal to 300 kilogram-force.” The differen‐
tiation between the vector and the force is explicitly addressed, by stating that the former 
“represents” the latter. The congruence between the arrow on the sketch and the vector it 
denotates is also explicated, by several signs. The naming of both ends of the arrow (A and 
F) allows to call the arrow “AF” and add this signifier a miniature horizontal arrow indicat‐
ing that “AF” is actually a vector. Moreover, not only the sense and direction of the vector 
are represented on the sketch with the two ends “A” and “F,” but a scale is provided which 
explicitly makes the length of the arrow meaningful: it is the intensity of the vector, which is 
expressed in “kilogram-force.” Yet, by doing so, the arrow AF gains several properties that 
exceed the meaning of the mathematical object vector. As mentioned before, the arrow AF has 
something more than the vector  
⟶
 AF : a point of application. There is no congruence between 
the sketch and the mathematical model about this point of application, and the drawing 
of arrows for representing vectors can become tricky, particularly on sketches representing 
objects in a realistic form, rather than just with a dot. More importantly, the point or dot F 
used for calling the end of the arrow has no corresponding meaning in the linguistic semi‐
otic register of mathematics: a vector is only defined with a direction, sense, and intensity. 
Alternatively, the arrow AF could be representing two dots on an axis of forces in an abstract 
space, but it would make of A something else than a point of application, and AF would not 
represent the vector  
⟶
 AF anymore. Confusion may occur here, despite the effort to make the 
correspondence between semiotic registers more explicit, all the more so since the letter “F” 
chosen for the mysterious end of the arrow may suggest a relation with a force…
Sometimes, vectors are insufficient and what arrows provide in addition is needed. It is the 
case for representing a point of application.
Figure 8. First illustration of the chapter on forces [31], p. 16.
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In the sketch of Figure 9, the authors have used two types of line to deal with the issue of the 
point of application: the reaction force of the wall is drawn with a dashed arrow, and the two 
points of application are related with a dashed line across the door which represents the lever 
arm, all the way to the rotational axis of the torque, on which the action and reaction forces are 
articulated. The semiotics of this sketch supports the link between the Newtonian theory—in 
the linguistic semiotic register—and the sketch—in the analogic semiotic register. None of 
these precautions have been taken in Figure 5, for instance.
We have seen an example dealing with the point of application an arrow denotates alongside 
with the vector. The next example presents a case where the differentiation of arrows remains 
open to several possible interpretations, and where the caption introduces ambiguity rather 
than a clue for inferring the meaning of a specific arrow.
In the sketch of Figure 10, two arrows are differentiated graphically: the arrows have dotted 
or continuous lines, and start from two different faces of the object.
The dotted line starting from the center of the base of the object is associated with the caption 
“friction,” while the continuous line starting from the surface of a side of the object (alterna‐
tively the right and left side) is associated with the caption “sense of traction.” The dotted 
arrow plays a role for modeling a force of friction, the arrows itself denotating the sense and 
direction (and maybe magnitude) of a vector. The localization of the starting point of the arrow 
may also represent the point of application of the force of friction, even if it is here simplified 
by reducing it to a mathematical dot situated at the center of the base of the rectangle, on the 
line of contact with the ground.
What the continuous arrow represents is more difficult to infer from the sketch. It could 
denotate a vector modeling a pulling force. Yet, the caption refers exclusively to the “sense of 
traction,” which cannot be understood literally since the direction of the arrow should also 
be taken into consideration if the arrow denotates a vector, the direction of the vector and 
the direction of the arrow are congruent. Nevertheless, pairing the sense of movement and 
forces is typically the common sense a physics teacher opposes: friction forces and traction 
Figure 9. Illustration of a torque [31], p. 49.
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forces may have the same direction and sense, e.g., when holding a sledge slipping down a 
slope, and friction forces are not always in the opposite sense of acceleration, e.g., when a car 
accelerates. Since it is inducing such an association or confusion between force, acceleration, 
or movement by the lack of specification, the sketch of Figure 10 may support interpretations 
confusing the concepts of force and movement, which has consequences on the learner’s cogni‐
tive tasks of coordinating sketches and concepts, and more generally of reconstructing the 
concepts with the support of sketches.
Moreover, this sketch also supports the confusion mentioned earlier between the study of 
static and dynamic situations. Figure 10 actually represents a stationary situation (i.e., with 
constant velocity), if the pedagogical objective is indeed to demonstrate that the friction force 
is a reaction force in the same direction and opposite sense to the traction force. Yet, the confu‐
sion between force and movement introduced by the caption “sense of the traction” supports 
the imagination of a “story,” a process: the object is first immobile, is then pulled—the arrow 
could even stand for the rope in this interpretation—and thus it moves, braked down by the 
friction force. In such a representation, the acceleration phase is completely overlooked. The 
friction force is a friction between the two surfaces instead of a resistance to start moving, 
while the  stationary situation could be standing for both cases.
The graphical differentiation of the two arrows is also operated through the choice of a 
different starting point for each arrow. The continuous arrow starts from the surface of the 
object. We have seen the semiotic challenge posed by the graphical representation of a point 
of application of a force, in particular when sketches are representing objects rather than dots. 
Following the modeling of objects as mathematical dots, any point of application of a force 
exerted on an object should be the center of gravity, according to the specific model used 
here. While we understand that the point of application of the dotted arrow in Figure 10 
is not quite the center of gravity, but the horizontal center on the line of contact with the 
ground, this leads to confusion when the interpretant tries to coordinate the dotted arrow 
with the continuous arrow. These arrows represent vectors which only need to be added 
to each other to be coordinated as a sum of forces exerted on the rectangle. But a novice 
reader could wonder whether he/she must think of torque. When representing a torque, in 
Figure 9, the author of the same schoolbook chooses to connect the points of application of 
the forces across the door, in order to represent the lever arm. Here in Figure 10, the sketch 
is not about torque and such semiotics would be irrelevant. Now, the point of application 
of the continuous arrow—on the surface of the object—is difficult to justify if the arrow is 
meant to denotate a vector. It rather supports an interpretation where the arrow designates 
a rope, a concrete object rather than an object of discourse [24] such as a vector. The problem 
identified here can be analyzed in terms of an ambiguous coordination between semiotic 
registers within the sketch. The sketch uses two different semiotic registers: one represents 
something; it is representational or figurative, while the other represents a model; it could 
be named modelative.1 The rectangle or the line representing respectively the object and 
the ground are figurative, while the point of application and the arrows are modelative. It is 
1In French, the adjective “modélisant” could avoid us to introduce a neologism, here. In English, yet, the lack of adjec‐
tive corresponding to modelling, the active form of the verb to model leads us to prefer a neologism to avoid ambiguity.
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interesting to note that the linguistic register does not always allow to differentiate such an 
ambiguity: the word attraction is also ambiguous, as attracting does not mean making some-
thing come in physics, but rather pulling even without any resulting movement.
This analysis would not be complete without considering the effect on interpretation of the 
arrows that are not drawn on the sketch. Since the interpretant, and more particularly the nov‐
ice, must rely on inferences for meaning making and on what there is on the sketch, the absent 
arrows may also influence such inferences. Typically, one may interpret arrows as represent‐
ing forces rather than movement, ropes or anything else, if there is one arrow on the sketch for 
each of the expected forces to be considered. Piaget shows in his theory how the whole system 
of operations allows a deeper understanding of each operation constituting such system. We 
may consider a sketch as a system—at least the interpretant expects the sketch to “work” 
consistently like a system—and the single operations used for interpreting it as depending 
on the interpretation of the whole. Following this hypothesis, the fact the earth attraction and 
the supporting force exerted by the ground on the object are not drawn in Figure 10 does 
not support the interpretation of the arrows as forces in this sketch, and would allow them 
various semiotic roles. If all the forces exerted on the object at a specific moment were drawn 
on the sketch it would support the interpretation of the arrows as denotating vectors and as 
modelative of forces and support the interpretation of the sketch as a whole as modelative of 
a stationary situation rather than of a dynamic, or of a truncated “story.”
Hence, not only what is on a sketch may open the possibility for misunderstandings, but also 
what is lacking. It is not surprising, considering that interpretation relies greatly on inference 
processes, for which consistency and repetition are important criteria. If a sketch contains four 
Figure 10. Illustration of friction forces [31], p. 27.
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arrows, among which one is ambiguous and the other three are clearly denotating vectors, the 
ambiguity is easily solved in favor of a consistent use of arrows that grants the semiotic object 
the same semiotic role within the sketch: the fourth arrow will also be interpreted as denotat‐
ing a vector. These a priori analyses draw the attention on the importance of consistent use 
of semiotic objects in science education, in order to support the desired interpretation. More 
detailed is the analysis, more problematic the consistency appears. We will continue to refine 
our investigation with a last analysis, interested in the differentiation between what arrows 
are modelative of.
3.4. A fourth analysis: vectors for various physical quantities
In this analysis, we provide several examples to raise the issue of the various physical quanti‐
ties vectors can model, and to provide illustration of clues that can be used in order to support 
the interpretation.
The graphical representation of a trajectory “equipped” with vectors for velocity, acceleration 
and force constitutes a classical example of a sketch with arrows, which we use for presenting, 
explaining, or using the second Law of Newton. Figure 11 illustrates a sketch with arrows for 
three types of vectors mentioned.
The arrows in Figure 11 are not distinguished according to the various physical quantities 
that the learner needs to differentiate. The sketch could raise nonsense questions as: “Why 
is the arrow representing velocity longer than the arrow representing the acceleration?” 
Meaningless practices could also be grounded on this sketch, such as adding or subtract‐
ing vectors modeling different physical quantities. In Figure 11, single letter captions have 
been added for each arrow, which could work as clues for the physical quantity represented 
by the arrows. As useful as it can be, the interpretation remains subject to the interpretant’s 
knowledge of implicit convention. For instance, “F” generally refers to the sum of all forces 
applied on the object, rather than to a specific force exerted on the object. This object is here 
reduced to a dot, consistently with the model: it is not a figurative object, but a modelative 
object. Moreover, the arrow associated with “F” has its arrow end on the object instead of its 
starting point, suggesting the idea that the force is “pushing” the object. Generally, the arrows 
Figure 11. Illustration of a graphical representation of various vectors implicated in Newton’s second law [32].
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denotating vectors are starting from the object, its center of mass if it is drawn as a figurative 
object. Yet, once again, a diversity of practices is not rare in science education, and often comes 
without a word of explanation. The linguistic register seems more consistent with arrows 
starting from the object, yet vectors are not only modeling properties of the object (such as 
velocity or acceleration) but actions experienced by the objects (such as forces). These relations 
that physical quantities have with the object are not signified by the mathematical expression 
of the second law—written on the caption “F” of the sketch—and can only be interpreted here 
from the knowledge of the interpretant.
In the following example (see Figure 12), arrows of various colors have been used to differen‐
tiate between the various physical quantities the arrows are modelative of.
This trick allows the teacher to address his students with the provocation presented in 
Figure 13: “this is not a triangle”
Figure 14 shows more examples of a color and shape scheme for arrows, depending on 
whether they are denotating a vector modeling velocity, acceleration, or forces.
The shapes and colors provide a clue for interpreting arrows as denotating vectors model‐
ing different physical quantities (i.e., force, acceleration, and velocity). Yet, there are no explicit 
criteria for the shape and colors: the author simply mentions that a particular care has been 
given to these representations. The practice of arrows in the schoolbook nevertheless shows 
that  vectors modeling acceleration have generally a double line and the color red, while tra‐
jectories or movements are represented with black lines and arrows. Vectors modeling forces 
are denotated by arrows of various colors throughout the book.
Figure 15 presents an example using colors, but from another book [35].
Figure 12. Exercise about vector quantities implied by Newton’s second law [33].
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The object is represented figuratively and there is here the problem of the point of applica‐
tion discussed earlier. There is an additional ambiguity due to the oblique vectors R1 and R2, 
which are not modeling additional forces experienced by the car, but the result of a composi‐
tion of forces already represented on the sketch.
Figure 13. “This is not a triangle”.
Figure 14. Illustration of vector quantities implied by Newton’s second law [34], p. 121 and p. 152.
Figure 15. Forces exerted on a car and velocity vector [35], p. 43.
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4. Discussion and ideas for further research
This brief inquiry about the semiotic roles played by arrows in a few sketches mediating com‐
munication in physics led us to consider several roles:
(1) a role in directing attention: pointing to a specific location on the sketch, in which the ar‐
row works as a graphical deictic;
(2) several roles in signifying:
(1) designating a movement ;
(2) designating a trajectory ;
(3) designating an action such as pulling or pushing ;
(4) denotating a vector which, in turns, is modeling several physical quantities, notably:
(1) a velocity of an object;
(2) an acceleration of an object;
(3) a single force experienced by an object;
(4) a sum of forces experienced by an object.
If it were not for the role in directing attention, for which the arrow does not represent any‐
thing, we would be tempted to consider arrows signs with several significations, just like 
words can have several entries in a dictionary. A “pound” means both a quantity of money 
and a mass. However, even without this role in directing the attention, analyzing arrows in 
science education is not that simple. Indeed, the arrow itself, as a semiotic object, has some 
properties such as the sense and direction, and the length, which are or are not congruent 
with the corresponding object of discourse in the linguistic register, depending on the semi‐
otic role played by the arrow. For instance, the direction and sense of an arrow denotating a 
vector are relevant, while the precise direction of an arrow denotating a pulling action on a 
door is not necessarily congruent with the linguistic correspondent—the force exerted on the 
door or its movement. Moreover, depending on the particular sketch in which the arrow is 
used, its length may be relevant or not: when a scale is associated to the length of the arrow 
and the arrow denotates a vector, its length can be interpreted as congruent with the mag‐
nitude of the vector. On a sketch with arrows denotating vectors modeling various physical 
quantities, however, the comparison of the length of the arrows is meaningless. The direction 
and sense of an arrow pointing at a specific location of a sketch is also partly irrelevant: it is 
only the combination of the two that achieve the pointing.
Hence, it appears that the actual coordinations the interpretant can or should do while inter‐
preting sketches in physics depends on the semiotic roles played by the arrows on the sketch, 
and depends on various other choices made during the design of the sketch.
When the arrow denotates a vector, there is congruence between the arrows direction and 
sense, sometimes its length, and the vectors direction and sense, sometimes its magnitude. 
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Establishing this congruence requires from the learner to coordinate two semiotic registers 
together: an analogic register used in the sketch, and a linguistic register using mathematical 
language and, more precisely, a mathematical object of discourse, i.e., vector. Within the ana‐
logic register used in sketches, the analysis has shown that two semiotic subregisters must be 
differentiated: a figurative representation of objects which represents objects as they appear in 
real, and a modelative representation which represents objects according to a specific model, 
operating specific reductionism following specific and systematic rules (e.g., representing an 
object by a material dot).
Moreover, some semiotic roles are not exclusive and can be used simultaneously or can be 
undifferentiated in a particular sketch. For instance, an arrow can indistinctively refer to the 
direction and sense of a movement and the vector modeling velocity. After all, if nothing is 
explicated, the coordination of semiotic registers largely depends on the knowledge of the 
interpretant. Many not‐so‐well‐made sketches work fine for those who know not to look at 
what could otherwise appear as “mistakes” in the representation.
We have raised the question of the coherence of the clues used to support the interpretant 
inferences in single sketches. This question can be addressed for physics in general, ques‐
tioning the coherence of the way arrows are used and how the diversity of usage is associ‐
ated with clues (graphical differentiation, captions, etc.). Despite an overall convention that 
arrows are used to denote vectors, more particularly vectors senses and directions, the few 
examples analyzed here advocate for a rather nonnormative use of arrows in science educa‐
tion. Detailed features such as the graphical rendering of the arrow, the point of application 
or the way to distinguish between various physical quantities modeled by vectors are not 
normed and vary within a single book, sometimes even within a single sketch. For the book, 
we showed with Figures 8–10 that dotted arrows could refer to various types of arrows, and 
despite a great care to graphical representation in this particular schoolbook [31].
The many challenges and risks of misunderstanding we could stress from a few examples of 
sketches only, build an overall impression of a wild language. The various ways sketches, and 
in particular arrows in these sketches, are used to mediate communication in the examples 
analyzed show that sketches are indispensable semiotic tools—some sort of proto-language—
and yet, the lack of systematic usage and conventions or norms stresses how uneducated these 
semiotic tools are. If it may be some sort of graphical proto-language, specific to physics or 
even to a chapter in physics, it does not follow the rules of other semiotic tools such as techni-
cal drawing, algebra, English syntax, etc. Sketches we examined remain for most of them unsys‐
tematic in the way they use semiotic objects such as arrows, and their interpretation depends 
highly on rules specific to each particular sketch, when there is any. The wilderness is not 
related to a lack of existing means, since older schoolbooks are sometimes better, and there are 
a number of means to provide the interpretant with clue to support the desired interpretation, 
which we stressed throughout the analysis.
Future research is needed to elaborate a more systematic semiotics for science education, 
both for describing existing practices and innovative ideas and for testing various semiotic 
norms, in order to investigate which ways are making the interpretation easier for specific 
issues.
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